

# So You've Got Authentication Now. Yippee.

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### **Obligatory Outline**



::: What Sender Domain Authentication Is

::: What Sender Domain Authentication Isn't

::: Brief DKIM Status Report

::: How Do You Make Authentication Useful?

::: How Do You Get it Adopted?

#### What Sender Domain Authentication Is



- ::: (Phrasing is very political)
- ::: Primarily, a way for a signer to be able to assert that they really did process the mail, at least as far as signing it
  - In some sense a signer is telling the world that it is willing to be judged on the basis of the messages it signs
  - Partially: non-repudiation
- ::: Secondarily, a way for domains used in From: header fields to communicate their Signing Practices

#### What Sender Domain Authentication Isn't



#### ... Perfect

- False auth failures will probably exist for some time until the structure of the net adapts
- In near time, will be primarily allow good senders to prove that a message came from them

### ::: An anti-spam mechanism, at least by itself

 Authentication does not mean goodness — spammers can authenticate too

## ::: A complete anti-phishing mechanism

- False failures make this problematic short term
- Also consider, the "similar-domain" problem (e.g., ebay-billing.com), the "full name" problem (e.g., eric@sendmail.com
  <phisher@phishers.r.us>

### DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail)



- ::: One of many authentication proposals
- ::: Based on cryptographic signatures
  - But not intended to overlap PGP or S/MIME
- ::: Currently in IETF WG
- ::: Threats document nearing completion
- Base document is looking fairly positive for publication this year
- ::: Signing Practices (much debate on name) will take longer and be controversial
  - Overlaps with reputation
- Overview document just starting
  - To have non-normative language
- ::: DNS RR type just starting

#### Making Authentication Useful



- ::: Just some examples:
- ::: Create reliable whitelisting
- ::: Display authentication results to user
- ::: Add reputation/accreditation and stir
- ::: Use it as input to a larger system
- ::: All of these have some current implementations but are also ripe research areas

#### Reliable Whitelisting



- ::: We do whitelisting today, but based on IP address (hard to manage) or unauthenticated addresses (easy to abuse)
- ::: Probably tied in with user's address book or similar mechanism so that it is reasonably transparent
- ::: May be able to auto-whitelist addresses that you send to (i.e., allow a response to come back)
- ::: Could be enterprise whitelisting for partners, customers, etc.
- ::: Undoubtedly many other clever algorithms

#### Display Authentication Results to User



- ::: Fairly obvious, but....
- ::: Has to be simple to understand
- ::: Probably should not display authentication failures for now
- ::: Should display the authenticated domain clearly
- ::: Should check to see if that domain is one the user knows about, has good rep, etc.
  - Don't put green smiley-face next to phishing site
- ::: Combine with reputation reporting, etc.

#### Add Reputation/Accreditation and Stir



- ::: Probably the next big development area
- ::: Still many research/development areas here
  - Domains with mixed reputations (e.g., ISPs)
  - Distribution of reputation/accreditation information
  - Reputation recovery
  - Meta-reputation (reputation of reputation and accreditation servers)
  - Feedback loops
  - Who pays? (Sender, Recipient, nobody, other)






- ::: For example, spamassassin might use authenticated domains differently than unauthenticated domains
- ::: Consider whitelists, blacklists, content scanning, challenge/response, etc.
- ::: If most of my mail comes from known-good, authenticated senders, I don't need to content scan and can lower my FP rate
- ::: Example (next page)

## Potential Acceptance Flowchart (Simplified)





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### **Authentication Adoption**



- ... A bit of chicken and egg problem
- ::: Several large senders already adopting DomainKeys
  - Yahoo!, Gmail, Ebay, others
  - Creates demand for recipients to verify
  - Not a huge step from DK to DKIM
- ::: Initially really only useful for filtering in good mail
  - This is valuable can reduce false positive rate
- ::: Challenge: Improving infrastructure to allow filter out
  - No munging in MTAs
  - All mailing list exploders updated
  - 8-bit MIME ubiquitous
  - Definitely a long-term horizon

#### **Conclusions and Comments**



- ::: Identity-based filtering can be a significant addition to the anti-spam toolkit
- ::: Need authentication to achieve full potential of identity-based filtering
- ::: Many areas ripe for research and development



Questions?